MVA Transfer Pricing by Lou, Wujiang
MVA Transfer Pricing 
 
Wujiang Lou1 
Oct 12, 2015. Updated July 28, 2016. 
 
Abstract 
This article prices OTC derivatives with either an exogenously determined initial 
margin profile or endogenously approximated initial margin. In the former case, margin 
valuation adjustment (MVA) is defined as the liability-side discounted expected margin 
profile, while in the latter, an extended partial differential equation is derived and solved 
for an all-in fair value, decomposable into coherent CVA, FVA and MVA. For 
uncollateralized customer trades, MVA can be transferred to the customer via an 
extension of the liability-side pricing theory. For BCBS-IOSCO covered OTC 
derivatives, a market maker has to charge financial counterparties a bid-ask spread to 
transfer its funding cost. An IM multiplier is applied to calibrate to external IM models to 
allow portfolio incremental pricing. In particular, a link to ISDA SIMM for equity, 
commodity and fx risks is established through the PDE with its vega and curvature IM 
components captured fully. Numerical examples are given for swaps and equity 
portfolios and offer a plausible attribution of recent CME-LCH basis spread widening to 
elevated MVA accompanying dealers’ hedging of customer flows. 
 
Keywords: initial margin, margin valuation adjustment (MVA), ISDA SIMM, liability-
side pricing, coherent CVA and FVA, CME-LCH basis. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As September 2016 rollout of margin requirements for non-centrally cleared OTC 
derivatives (BCBS-IOSCO 2015) is fast approaching, derivatives pricing with initial 
margin (IM) remains a significant challenge as IM, essentially a capital measure of 
potential future exposure based on historical data, forces its way into a pricing model 
under the risk neutral measure. At a fixed future time, for example, the short rate would 
evolve and accumulate filtration under both the risk neutral and the physical measure. As 
such, a model implementing initial margin strictly to its CCP or BCBS-IOSCO 
specifications would have to resort to Monte Carlo simulation. To be truthful to specs, a 
brute force simulation would simulate a path in the pricing measure, adopt it as an 
extended historical set of data in the physical measure, update the scenarios including 
stress scenarios, and conduct a separate or layered simulation in the physical measure for 
initial margin, conditional on the path. IM’s path dependency destroys the Markovian 
property of the price process afforded by existing rate models and limits our modeling 
and analytics options. 
                                                 
1 The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author, and do not reflect 
those of his employer and any of its affiliates. The author would like to thank Naosuke Nakamura, Marco 
Ossanna, Gary Li and an anonymous reviewer for valuable suggestions. Earlier versions are titled 'Initial 
margin funding cost transfer pricing and MVA'. 
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Green and Kenyon (2015) calculate initial margin as Value-at-Risk (VaR) by 
simulation using a fixed set of exogenously determined historical scenarios, ignoring 
scenario updating, which is questionable for long duration swap portfolios as BCBS 
stipulates a historical period of not exceeding 5 years. Brigo and Pallavicini (2014) define 
initial margin in the pricing measure, as the q-quantile of a normal variate with its 
variance matching that of the conditional close-out amount in the margin period of risk. 
While forward scenario updating is captured, connection to the physical measure is lost. 
On the other hand, IM calculations have largely been standardized, for example, ISDA's 
standard initial margin model (SIMM), and made available from vendors, providing an 
opportunity for models to focus on the pricing aspect. 
Technicality aside, a derivatives desk’s concern is how to manage or transfer the 
added cost of posting initial margin. When two CCP clearing members trade CCP cleared 
derivatives or two covered counterparties2 trade non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives, 
both parties post initial margin and both incur funding costs. The bilateral trade alone 
does not offer any economic way of cost transfer, unless one party takes the role of a 
market maker who then packs the cost into his bid-ask spread. A more meaningful case of 
cost transfer occurs when a clearing member trades with a non-clearing client and has to 
fund initial margin on its hedge trade through the CCP, or similarly when a covered entity 
trades with a non-covered one and hedges with another covered entity. In such a case, the 
client side pricing effectuates the cost transfer.  
This paper contributes a balanced approach by computing IM as a delta-
approximated VaR in the pricing measure that naturally captures forward and local 
updating, with a portfolio specific multiplier allowing calibration to external models 
meeting CCP or BCBS-IOSCO requirements. This approach is advantageous in that it 
preserves usual Markov properties and allows PDE and its efficient solutions, avoiding 
the need of exclusively relying on a layered local simulation that is computationally 
demanding and often subject to dangerous shortcuts. In particular, ISDA's SIMM can be 
fully integrated into the PDE for equity, commodity and fx derivatives. IM funding cost 
is incorporated in the back-to-back derivatives pricing setting in the liability-side pricing 
framework where CVA and FVA are coherently defined to abide by the law of one price, 
different from Green and Kenyon (2015) which is derived from Burgard and Kjaer 
(2011) where funding cost is considered from a private value perspective. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 incorporates a redundant initial 
margin account into the back-to-back swap hedging economy to extend the liability-side 
Black-Scholes-Merton partial differential equation and defines MVA for an exogenously 
prescribed initial margin profile. Section 3 employs the delta approximation of VaR to 
compute initial margin and derives a more analytically tractable PDE for the fair value 
with initial margin funding costs. Section 4 discusses BCBS-IOSCO covered OTC 
derivatives, incorporates gamma and vega approximation to link with ISDA's SIMM, and 
shows that the cost transfer has to be in the form of a bid/ask spread. Section 5 applies 
finite difference and Monte Carlo simulation to compute standalone single trade and 
swap and equity option portfolios MVA. Section 6 concludes. 
  
                                                 
2 Per BCBS-IOSCO 2015, all financial firms and systemically important non-financial entities (“covered 
entities” or financial counterparties) engaging in non-central cleared OTC derivatives are required to post 
full variation margin and bi-way segregated initial margin, subject to a minimum level of activity. 
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2. Liability-side PDE of Uncollateralized Trades 
 
Initial margin is essentially a reserve or defaulter-pay capital for potential future 
exposure (PFE) during a margin period of risk (MPR). For capturing funding cost 
purposes, we idealize this reserve as redundant3. 
 
2.1. Redundant initial margin account 
Consider a hypothetical bank (party B, a CCP clearing member) clears a 
derivatives portfolio and posts IM to a CCP. If the bank defaults, the bank’s trade with 
CCP would get assigned to an operating clearing member. In an orderly and timely 
transfer, derivatives portfolio would be taken over at their fair value which is fully 
margined, so that B’s initial margin with the CCP would get returned in whole. If party 
B’s client defaults, the client side trades settle and the CCP side swaps can be terminated 
by B immediately with a full return of incremental IM. In an efficient default settlement 
that takes no time to occur, initial margin is thus redundant. 
Liquidation of a defaulting CCP member of course does not happen 
instantaneously. A default and subsequent margin settlement window could take days and 
market could move negatively during such a margin period of risk (MPR), resulting in 
losses. In the standard credit risk pricing approach, the expected loss (EL) is priced in 
while the unexpected loss (UL) is treated as capital. Because the period is only couple 
days, the loss distribution’s EL is very small and its UL far outweighs EL. Initial margin 
basically is a VAR-kind of UL measure, a reserve rather than an economic loss, and is 
expected to be fully returned. While the probability of exhausting the IM is only 1%, the 
probability of some partial yet significant loss (say 30%) to IM is not necessarily small.   
Green and Kenyon (2015) also separate potential losses from IM, arguing that any 
loss shall be considered from B’s capital account, which would command a capital charge 
to the client to compensate the propensity of loss. In fact, it goes beyond being redundant 
as IM is used to fund the derivatives. Obviously, funding IM requirement rather than 
coping with potential loss to its IM when the firm defaults is business for a going-
concern, providing further support for a bank to adopt such a stylized redundant initial 
margin account to evaluate valuation impact and dictate price transfer. In formalizing IM 
as a redundant reserve, we agree with Green and Kenyon to treat loss to IM separately4. 
Meanwhile, the cost of maintaining IM accumulates over the derivatives’ lifespan 
in years and is far greater than cost of replenishing potential IM loss over the MPR in 
days. Therefore a redundant IM account is a reasonable assumption to make in the 
presence of a short MPR, to evaluate its valuation impact and dictate price transfer.  
     
2.2. PDE with initial margin funding cost 
Suppose an uncollateralized customer (party C) enters into an interest rate swap 
(swap #1) with party B. The bank hedges the interest rate risk by continuously trading in 
a number of CCP swaps with a dealer (party D), another CCP member firm. Swap #1 has 
a unit notional. The CCP swap hedges have dynamic notional of Δk, k=1, 2, ..., K. CCP 
                                                 
3 Redundant reserve is a common term in insurance literature, defined as the surplus of the statutory reserve 
over the economic reserve. 
4 An effort has been made since to capture loss to IM, see "Capital pricing during margin periods of risk 
and repo KVA", Wujiang Lou, available in SSRN. 
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swaps are fully collateralized in cash and priced at the risk-free rate r(t). Let Vk
* denote 
the fair value of k-th CCP swap per unit notional, Ls
 the variation margin account balance 
under the CCP swap clearing agreement, then Ls=∑ΔkV*k, assuming that collaterals are 
maintained perfectly and continuously. If the client swap is a plain swap directly cleared 
in CCP, then the hedge can be done in a back-to-back fashion (Lou 2016), i.e., K=1.  
Furthermore let LI ≥0 be an adapted process denoting the segregated IM amount 
posted by B to CCP on the hedge portfolio. The collateral posted to the account is 
assumed to be cash and receives r on its balance. 
On the client side, there is neither variation margin nor initial margin between 
party B and C. Additionally, party B maintains a bank account and short term borrowing 
account. Let Mt ≥0 be the bank account balance that earns interest at r, Nt≥0 the 
borrowing account balance that pays par rate rN(t), rN(t)≥r(t).  
For modeling purposes, a voluntary cash deposit account Lt is added to the 
economy to record the mutually funded cash deposit under the liability-side pricing 
principle (Lou 2015). The main idea is that the client is indifferent to making a cash 
deposit or loan to the bank so long as the loan earns its current market debt rate as the 
money loaned could be raised from the debt market. Write ,

 ttt LLL  

tL  the cash 
amount loaned by party C to B that pays C’s cash debt interest rate rc(t), and 

tL  the cash 
loan by B to C earning B’s interest rate rb(t). Furthermore, the fair value of swap #1 is 
fully covered by the deposit, i.e., Lt=Vt. 
The wealth equation of the hedged swap economy reduces to the balance of the 
bank account and the debt account,  
 
),)(1())(1( * ItttIskktttttt LNMLLVNLVM    
 
where 1-Γ is party B and C’s joint survival indicator. To fully replicate the pre-default 
portfolio, we set  π = 0. Consequently Mt =0 and Nt = LI, reflecting the obvious that, 
under this setup, the initial margin amount is the only item left to be funded. 
Now if the bank defaults, the cash loan as a receivable to C and the derivative as a 
payable to C set off under the ISDA set-off provision and there is no default settlement, 
avoiding the need of an auction style liquidation process which would entail a margin 
period of risk. The bank’s trade with CCP gets assigned to another operating clearing 
member with zero loss to IM. If party C defaults, the client side trade again settles 
trivially under set-off and CCP swaps can be terminated by B immediately with a full 
return of IM.  
The returned IM can be used to pay back the borrowing amount Nt, so that there is 
no gain or loss to both issuer and holders of Nt. In this idealized setting, Nt has an 
endogenous par recovery and is credit risk free. In fact, N can be seen as a secured 
funding note with IM as its collateral5. 
Excluding the finite number of discrete swap payment dates, there is no swap 
cashflow pre-default, so the financing equation is written as follows, 
                                                 
5 Bank's claim, or residual interest, on IM posted to the CCP or BCBS-IOSCO covered counterparties can 
be assigned to a trust which then issues certificates to finance the IM. The certificates could be made 
recourse on the bank, in a form similar to a credit linked notes. The coupon rate of the certificates reflect 
market's credit risk assessment, i.e., propensity of IM losses.   
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Plugging in collateral account balances, this becomes, 
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Let ρ be the interest rate governing swap payments, driven by multiple factors xj , 
j = 1, 2, ., J, under a proper risk neutral measure Q, where each factor is modeled as a 
diffusion process, jjjj dWbdtadx  with Wj being independent Brownian motions.  
V* then solves the following PDE,  
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where At is the generator of the vector diffusion process, 
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. Suppose that all short rates are a function of ρ. Noting the above and applying 
Ito’s lemma to Vt and V* lead to 
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Assume that a unique swap delta hedge exists, 
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, and set dt term 
to zero, we arrive at,  
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where )0)(()()0)(()()(  tVItrtVItrtr cbe  is the switching discount rate and 
sI=rN-r is the funding rate of IM. On swap payment dates, V jumps in accordance with the 
jump in the swap cumulative dividend process D(t). Applying Feynman-Kac theorem to 
arrive at the pricing formulae, 
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When IM is redundant, the uncollateralized swap can be replicated by CCP swaps 
as before, in both risk sense and cashflow sense. The latter can be seen from 1T , 
necessarily from the terminal boundary condition VT=V
*
T = DT, where DT is payoff of the 
swap at maturity T. 
 Let U=V*-V be the valuation adjustment to the risk-free price V*, U is given by  
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In addition to the counterparty risk adjustment (CRA), the funding cost of initial 
margin introduces a new adjustment -- margin valuation adjustment (MVA). If initial 
margin LI is known or computed exogenously, for instance, by means of referencing a 
standardized schedule, the PDE can be solved by finite difference methods, avoiding the 
need of running Monte Carlo simulation. Decomposition of CRA into bilateral, coherent 
CVA and FVA can be done by solving the PDE with shifts in each parties’ synthetic or 
cash curves (Lou 2015) and MVA is obtained by subtracting CRA from the total 
valuation adjustment. Because MVA itself is part of the fair value, strictly speaking, the 
formulae for MVA is recursive. An implementation directly calculating MVA however 
risks to have open IR01 that could attract capital in the same way as FVA when defined 
imprecisely (Lou 2016), while a PDE based solution is not concerned. 
The MVA formulae is different from Green and Kenyon (2015) where the 
discount factor is the product of the risk-free discount factor and the joint survival 
probability and the IM funding rate is tied to the dealer’s unsecured rate rb, a result of 
assuming the risk-free close-out and extending Burgard and Kjaer (2011), which 
innovatively and yet controversially introduces a bank's own funding cost into derivatives 
fair value.  Our formulae comes from the liability-side pricing theory which deviates 
away from Burgard and Kjaer, and has such desirable aspects as law-of-one-price 
conforming, FVA relating to bond-CDS basis or liquidity basis, total counterparty risk 
adjustment (CRA=CVA+FVA) of a bond consistent with bond pricing, and explicit rule 
for which discount curve to use6.  
Also the IM funding rate is tied to the dealer’s unsecured rate rb in Green and 
Kenyon (2015), while we have left rN open. Setting rN to rb is of course an option, 
although a conservative and expensive one, as IM is certainly of collateral value, due to 
its tail loss nature.     
   
3. Initial Margin Valuation Adjustment with Delta Approximation 
 
To gain better insight of the impact of funding cost of initial margin on 
derivatives pricing and its contribution relative to other factors such as counterparty 
                                                 
6 In "Unlocking the FVA Debate" (W Lou, 2015, available in ssrn), Lou considers three segments of the 
OTC derivatives market, the competitive market, the non-competitive market, and the limited competitive 
market, and proposes to apply law-of-one-price model to competitive market, private value model (Burgard 
and Kjaer and its variants) to non-competitive market.  
   
  7 
  
credit risk and funding measure, we adopt delta approximation of VaR. Consider a 
scenario shift δxj associated with IM calculation, to the first order the change in the CCP 
swap portfolio value can be written, 
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In particular, for a one-factor diffusion model, bdWadtd  , IM can be 
estimated as 
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where α is the normal deviate corresponding to a given confidence interval, e.g., 2.33 for 
99% one-sided quantile, and δ  is the length of the VaR period in years7. 
Plugging into the PDE to obtain, 
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IM funding cost now shows in the PDE’s delta term. Intuitively all capital 
measure involves a position’s price variability which for a derivative is governed by its 
delta, to the first order.  
To gain some insight, let's consider the extra counterparty risk protection afforded 
by initial margin that can be alternatively accomplished by an overcollateralized variation 
margin account. In fact, IM resembles the collateral posted up to a security lender in a 
short stock trade where the additional cash collateral is determined by haircut. Because 
haircut is a percentage applied to fair value, it would affect the rate of return on V but 
pricing can proceed in the usual Markovian way. For derivatives, however, we cannot set 
a fixed haircut exactly because of its delta.  A deep out-of-the-money bond option 
nearing expiry for example has zero chance of loss, therefore a minimal or zero haircut 
suffices. A deep in-the-money option on the same bond has the same risk profile as 
holding a unit of bond, so its haircut will follow that of the underlying bond, which is 
captured as  Pb  where P is bond price and  is bond price volatility. 
Approximation IM with b
P
V

  is simply multiplying the underlying bond haircut 
b with the delta, exactly reflecting the derivative’s leverage effect by taking the 
underlying’s haircut timed delta as the derivative’s value haircut. In this sense, the 
derivative’s haircut is dynamic and when it enters the PDE, it is intuitively captured in 
the delta term. 
 
                                                 
7 BCBS has 10 business days, CME is 5 day VaR with 99%, and LCH 99.5% ES 5 days for members or 7 
days for non-member clients. 
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3.1. Swap MVA 
 
For a payer swap, its DV01 is always positive and for a receiver swap negative. 
The sign function in the delta term is resolved and the PDE returns to its familiar 
liability-side pricing form, for example, for a receiver swap, 
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 The swap PDE's delta term now sees a drift in the amount of λb, suggesting 
another equivalent Martingale measure P~ for computing the IM adjusted fair value. This 
delta approximation induced measure however should not be confused with the real 
world measure P and  Is >0 is not the market price of risk. The increased drift in 
the short rate corresponds to lowered price for zero coupon bonds, meaning less pv on the 
received fixed rate payments, thus a lower swap npv. For an ATM swap (at par rate) 
priced at zero npv in the pricing measure Q, its npv in P~ would be negative. To bring it 
back to zero, the fixed rate has to be increased so that the ask or receiver swap rate is 
higher than the par rate. 
For a payer swap,  Is . This lowered short rate corresponds to a higher 
zero price, making the payer ATM swap again negative. To bring it back to par, the swap 
rate has to be reduced below the par rate. This exactly amounts to a lowered bid. Now we 
see that the funding cost of initial margin contributes to a swap rate bid/ask spread. 
For vanilla swaps, the uncollateralized fair value V can now be written as a risky 
discounted expectation under a changed measure P~ where the rate process has a shifted 
drift, 
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The fair value without initial margin, denoted as VQ, is simply the same expectation 
under the risk-neutral measure Q. MVA is the difference between these two fair values, 
MVA = VQ - VP~. 
Using delta approximation to compute VaR and IM is not new, but introducing it 
into a PDE setting allows us to apply traditional numerical techniques such as a tree or 
lattice model when the dimension is low such is the case at a single trade level or a 
granular portfolio, e.g., a commodity portfolio of a single underlying or rate. For 
standalone vanilla swaps, the Crank-Nicholson FD scheme (Lou 2016) can be used 
directly with an adjusted drift coefficient. The regression/simulation procedure designed 
to handle the discount switch can be modified to handle the delta switch as well, allowing 
computing MVA alongside CVA and FVA.  
   
3.2. IM multiplier 
 
While VaR is measured in the real world, risk metrics involving future such as 
potential future exposures (PFE) are debatably measured in the real world, or the risk 
neutral world, or both (Stein 2015), with noticeable differences. Initial margin, essentially 
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a VaR measure of OTC derivatives portfolio’ PFE, is subject to both. Its delta 
approximation, while allowing us to keep the pricing task in the Markovian domain and 
capturing IM’s forward profile, is solely under the risk neutral measure and does not 
touch upon the non-procyclicality requirement, which is met with historical simulations 
in the real world. To accommodate each CCP’s specific initial margin calculation 
method, a constant multiplier is incorporated into parameter α. 
 Specifically, rewrite α= αqη, where αq is the q-quantile and η is a multiplier 
specific to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), for instance. Conceptually this 
multiplier also captures the requirement of a historical stress period where the short rate 
volatility has increased. Its calibration to CCP's IM methodology and choices of historical 
scenarios re-establishes MVA's link to the real world. 
A dealer’s implementation can calibrate the multiplier to its whole portfolio with 
a CCP and apply it to a new trade on an incremental basis. When adding a new trade to a 
dv01 balanced swap portfolio, for example, the dealer may not charge the full 
incremental cost of financing IM to the new trade, on the ground that bid/ask spread 
collected on trades in the portfolio could shoulder a large portion of the cost. 
Correspondingly the multiplier η could be made smaller to reflect this reduced charge. 
This leads to an incremental pricing scheme, illustrated later with an explanation of 
CME-LCH basis spread. 
A firm developing internal quantitative IM models can further factor the 
multiplier into a stress volatility multiplier and a portfolio netting multiplier. The latter 
can be taken as 0.4+0.6*NGR deduced from BCBS-IOSCO’s standardized IM method 
where the net standardized initial margin equals to 0.4+0.6*NGR times aggregated 
products of the standardized margin rate and the gross notional size of each derivatives 
contract. NGR is defined as the net replacement cost over the gross replacement cost8 for 
transactions subject to legally enforceable netting agreements. 
With IM calculation complimented with a multiplier, IM funding cost now rests 
on the funding rate charged on IM. As discussed earlier, IM bears little credit risk and 
could be used to secure an issuance of funding notes N. If N at the same time has a 
recourse to the general credit of the bank in a senior unsecured rank9, the eventual loss 
given default on N is very small. We assume that LGD applicable to N is zero, so that the 
PDE derived stands as is, while the IM funding rate could incorporate the firm’s senior 
unsecured funding rate or even capital charge rate with the effect of leverage ratio 
incorporated as shown in Section 5. 
For incremental pricing, as a firm could benefit from reduced IM and its funding 
cost, the multiplier can be made algebraic with a positive value indicating the existing 
portfolio is long delta, negative short delta. Furthermore, one can adopt an asymmetric 
multiplier scheme where separate multipliers (η+ and η-) are applied to the positive delta 
and negative delta locally. For uncollateralized options, similar PDE can be obtained, 
either by repeating the CCP replicating exercise in Section 2 or by conducting usual 
dynamic hedging with underlying stocks (Lou 2015) with an initial margin account 
added. To highlight MVA’s contribution to option bid/ask, we show below the bid and 
ask side fair values Vb and Va’s PDEs. 
                                                 
8 NGR made out of net dv01 vs gross dv01 is more appropriate given IM's link to delta. 
9 The debt can be issued for instance as a structured note of the bank or swap dealer that references the loss 
to IM. 
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We see that on the bid side, the margin funding cost term (the third term) deducts 
value from bid while on the ask side (second PDE), it adds value to ask-side, thus 
creating a wider bid/ask spread. The delta approximation, though crude at the first sight, 
does capture the shortened duration effect of a swap or options portfolio because it is 
applied locally. It could be complemented with gamma and vega approximation as shown 
in the next section.  
 
4. BCBS-IOSCO Non-centrally Cleared OTC Derivatives  
 
 BCBS-IOSCO covered trades are no longer uncollateralized as in Section 2. Let 
Wt be the bilateral variation margin posted in cash earning interest at the risk-free rate. 
Write ,

 ttt WWW  

tW  the cash amount posted by party C to B, and 

tW  B to C. 
Following similar derivation in Section 2 or Lou (2015), one can easily arrive at the 
following, 
 
 0)()( 


IIet LsrWWVrVA
t
 
 )0)()(()()0)()(()()(  tWtVItrtWtVItrtr cbe .  
 
For BCBS-IOSCO covered trades, W(t)=V(t) so that the PDE reduces to 
 
 0)( 

 b
II
bb
t LsrVVA
t
 
 
where we have denoted superscript 'b' as party B on the bid side, i.e., Vb is its bid for the 
derivative. Note that the PDE is same as the Black-Scholes equation except for the IM 
funding cost term and that the same risk-free discount curve applies. For a call option, for 
instance, this would intuitively produce a lower fair price Vb than the risk-free price V* 
without IM impact.  
 Party C is on the other side and the PDE for its fair price Vc would look like, 
assuming the same IM funding spread, 
 0)( 

 c
II
cc
t LsrVVA
t
 
 
 We then have trivially Vb<V*<Vc, indicating that party B and C would never see 
the same prices.  
 Because of bilateral variation margin (and the added credit risk mitigation with 
initial margin), the industry standard OIS discount applies to BCBS-IOSCO trades. Now 
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suppose two covered counterparties B and D attempt to price an OTC derivative in an 
attempt to recoup their respective IM funding costs. On a standalone basis, party B – the 
bidding party -- wants to deduct its funding cost from the bid price while on the ask side, 
party C wants to recover its funding cost by asking for a higher price. Neither side can 
effectuate a funding cost transfer, unless one side backs down and lets the other side act 
in a market making role. Vc can then be taken as its ask price while Vb bid price. For 
accounting purposes, the fair value could remain the risk-free price, leaving MVA or IM 
funding charges into bid/ask, should a firm choose to do so.  
 This has to be the case when the parties trade and clear through a CCP. CCP 
cleared trades are subject to the same PDE, bid or ask side, from the market maker's point 
of view. The only difference is that IM is now posted to the CCP rather than a segregated 
account with the counterparty. The CCP as the valuation agent can't be aware of either 
party's IM funding cost and the only agreeable valuation is to have it stripped from CCP 
valuation, resulting in the risk-free price. 
We conclude that in a standalone trade, financial counterparties will not be able to 
transfer its funding cost to the other party, unlike when they trade with an 
uncollateralized client. Same is true for the whole OTC derivatives portfolio between 
financial counterparties.  
 
4.1. ISDA SIMM Connectivity 
 
 For derivatives on a single asset risk factor (stock price or commodity or fx rate), 
the delta approximation formalized by ISDA can be built into the PDE. Take for example, 
the equity risk's delta initial margin is defined as the product of a bucketed risk weight 
and the derivatives' sensitivity (ISDA 2016), %RWS
VSLI 
 . For equity indices, ISDA 
proposes a risk weight of 15. If we take SPX's volatility at 15%, the multiplier needed to 
calibrate LI to SIMM is 2.2.  
 Similarly, SIMM's curvature (or gamma) margin Lgamma and vega margin Lvega can 
be written as  
 gammagamma R
RW
S
VSL

 %2
2
22 )
2
1
(

  
 )()
2
1
( %2
2
22 tTR
RW
S
VSL vegavega 


  
 
where Rgamma is 0.5586, Rvega 0.9218
10, RW% is the SIMM's risk weight divided by 100. 
                                                 
10 SIMM's IM for equity risk's vega boils down to   
)(0.01*365/14
(0.99)
RW
=VR
1  


V  
where 

V
0.01
 is vega sensitivity defined as price change over 1% change in volatility. The Black-Scholes 
formulae gives 
2
2
2


 



 V
ST
V  ,  and IM_vega = VRW*VR where VRW for equity is 0.21. So 
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
)(
2
1
*)
RW
009218.0(
(0.99)
RW
21.0*365/140.01=IM_vega




 





V
ST
V
ST
.  
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Putting these IM into the PDE leads to 
 
0)))((1())sgn(( %
2
2
22
2
1
% 











rV
RW
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S
V
S
S
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V
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
  
 
Now the SIMM compliant BCBS_IOSCO equity derivatives can be fully priced in the 
PDE approach. 
 The multiplier does not enter here as the above is derived directly from SIMM's 
single asset model specifications. It however can be re-introduced to the delta term and 
calibrated, if the IM model has other risk factors, e.g., correlation. This would constitute a 
second approximation, as this number is different from the multiplier in Section 3 where 
it is calibrated to capture the IM difference between the risk neutral world and the real 
world, while here IM's gamma and vega components are separately captured. 
 For a portfolio of equity derivatives, adding or removing a position to the existing 
portfolio will incur netting and diversification effect under SIMM's two-level correlation 
structure. The incremental portfolio margin can be allocated to the position, e.g. via a net 
to gross proportional scheme. A multiplier can then be plugged in to reflect the allocated 
IM being smaller than the standalone IM. 
 
4.2. Solving PDE with IM funding cost 
 
The PDE capturing the initial margin funding cost under delta approximation can 
be solved in a tree or lattice model when the dimension is low such is the case at a single 
trade level or a granular portfolio, e.g., a commodity portfolio (of single underlying or 
rate) borrowing from CME’s terminology. For plain vanilla swaps, payer or receiver, the 
Crank-Nicholson FD scheme (Lou 2016) can be used directly with an adjusted drift 
coefficient. For swap portfolios, an iteration is developed to cope with the discount rate 
switch and the delta switch of the initial margin funding cost. Computational results from 
a finite difference scheme will be shown in next section. 
For other cases, the regression/simulation procedure (Lou 2016) can be modified 
to compute MVA alongside of CVA and FVA. The simulation procedure could 
accommodate IM calculation either endogenously under the risk-neutral measure (with a 
multiplier) or exogenously under the physical measure. With the former, we can reuse the 
regression equation intended for the switching rate to get the fair value shock given the 
shocks to the underlying risk factors; with the latter, exogenously provided historical 
shocks can be applied through a regression/compression scheme shown in Green and 
Kenyon (2015). A separate regression equation might be needed as the regression for the 
rate switch is of lower accuracy requirement as it cares only about the sign of value, 
while the regression for IM needs to extend a wide range in good accuracy. 
For pricing a standalone new trade, the 99% shock can be applied in both 
directions. The worse loss of fair value is the estimated IM. For incremental pricing, as a 
firm could benefit from reduced IM and its funding cost, the multiplier can be made 
                                                                                                                                                 
 As for the curvature part, CVR~0.5*14/365/T*VR. Plug in VR formula for the above. T cancels 
out and CVR has the 
2
2
2)(
2
1



 V
S
 term. IM_gamma = (lamda+1)*CVR where lamda= (ϕ-1(0.99))^2-1 for 
single asset risk. Combining terms together leads to the IM_gamma coefficient. 
   
  13 
  
algebraic with a positive value indicating the existing portfolio is long delta, negative 
short delta. A local estimation of IM could then check on its local delta’s sign. If it’s of 
the same sign, then IM would be increased and a funding cost needs to be built in. If it is 
of opposite signs, a funding benefit results.  
 
5. Numerical Results 
 
The sample results presented below are based on two one-factor Markovian short 
rate models, mixed-normal-lognormal model and Black-Karasinski model. The former 
has the form ,)()( dWrdtradrt    where the volatility function is defined as  
,
015.0
)( 2
r
r   for r<0.015, 2)(  r  for 0.06<r0.015  , and 2
06.0
)( 
r
r   for 
r≥0.06, with parameters estimation on historical data σ2=1.05%, a=0.05, θ=0.04411 (Hull 
et al 2014). Black-Karasinski model has ,)( dWdtxdxt    )exp( tt xr  , where κ, 
µ, σ are positive constants.  
The risk-free rate is a constant spread below the LIBOR short rate, using a recent 
average 3 month LIBOR-OIS spread of 13 bp. Fix the long term average short rate at 
4.4%, each model has three parameters to calibrate. We choose the three month LIBOR 
rate, 10 year ATM swap rate of 235.87 bp, and 10 year ATM cap at a yield value of 
86.83 bp. Party B and C’s cash funding curves are assumed to be a deterministic spread 
above the LIBOR short rate. 
All numerical results are obtained by solving the PDE with Crank-Nicholson 
finite difference scheme. 
 
5.1. Standalone uncollateralized trade pricing 
 
To demonstrate, we set Party B’s CDS (zero recovery rate) short rate to 75 bp and 
its funding basis 50 bp on top of LIBOR, approximated single ‘A’ rated.  C’s spread to 
LIBOR varies from 37.5 to 1000 bp, roughly reflecting credit rating range of 
“AAA/AA+” to “B”. C’s funding basis are 15, 30, 50 bp for the first three ‘rating’s and 
80 bp for the rest. The MPR is 10 days and multiplier is set to 3 so that current delta 
approximation of the swap is approximately same as CME’s initial margin amount.   
 
Table 1 shows the swap npv and its adjustments (yield values in bp) with respect 
to the risk free price, broken down into CVA, DVA, CFA, DFA and finally MVA.  Here 
we set sN to 50 bp (30 bp cost of fund + 20 bp for 10 year LIBOR swap and OIS swap 
spread.) For a “BBB” client, MVA is about 2 bp. MVA is higher for better rated clients, 
for the fixed funding cost of initial margin has to be carried longer time on average 
because there is less likelihood of early termination due to counterparty C’s default. The 
total counterparty credit and funding adjustment (sum of CVA and CFA) obviously 
increases as counterparty’s credit quality deteriorates.  
 
                                                 
11 This number itself is a historical mean, used here without market price of risk adjustment as mean in the 
pricing measure. 
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Table 1. 10y ATM payer swap valuation adjustments with a single ‘A’ rated dealer facing 
a counterparty of hypothetic ‘AAA/AA+’ to ‘B’ rating. 
 
C-Libor "Rating" NPV CVA DVA CFA DFA MVA 
37.5 AAA/AA+ -3.55 1.48 0.31 0.61 0.17 2.37 
75 AA/AA- -4.98 2.39 0.32 1.19 0.18 2.32 
125 A -6.83 3.59 0.33 1.91 0.18 2.26 
250 BBB -11.12 7.18 0.35 2.8 0.2 2.12 
500 BB -18.57 15.45 0.41 2.32 0.24 1.88 
1000 B -30.05 28.15 0.56 1.65 0.32 1.55 
 
For a receiver swap, MVA is about the same magnitude as the payer swap, e.g. 
2.24 bp for a “BBB” client vs 2.12 bp for a payer swap shown above. For a single ‘B’ 
client, the difference is more pronounced, with receiver swap MVA at 2.07 bp vs payer’s 
1.55 bp. This can be explained as the exposure contingent on client’s default is smaller in 
a receiver so the benefit of early termination is less than the payer. 
MVA is almost linearly dependent on the multiplier. If the multiplier for instance 
is set at 4 to roughly match LCH.ClearNet’s initial margin for the same 10 year ATM 
swap, the payer swap’s MVA becomes 2.82 bp for a ‘BBB’ client, 0.70 bp on top of 
CME’s MVA charge of 2.12 bp. In fact with multiplier at 1, the payer’s MVA is 0.71 bp. 
MVA’s sensitivity to funding rate is also close to linear for the swap priced. With 
multiplier set at 1, a doubled initial margin funding rate (at 100 bp) results in payer’s 
MVA at 1.41 bp, and 0.35 bp if the funding rate is reduced by half.  
 
5.2. Uncollateralized swap portfolio valuation 
 
The model developed is not limited to a single trade application. For a portfolio of 
swaps, the fair value V is the portfolio npv and all valuation adjustments (CVA, FVA, 
and MVA) computed are at the portfolio level, fully reflecting its netting effect. Table 2 
shows a simple swap portfolio of a 5 year payer swap and a 10 year receiver swap (a 
hypothetic curve trade) with an uncollateralized party C of 80 bp funding basis and 295 
bp of CDS spread. The curve trade’s npv is -2.84 bp in effective yield while the sum of 
individually priced uncollateralized swaps is -5.36, a difference of 2.52 bp. Given B’s 
funding basis is 50 bp, and CDS spread is 75 bp, CVA exhibits the largest netting effect 
(last row in Table 2.) of 1.95 bp, down from 2.84 bp to 0.89 bp after netting. With IM 
funding charge of 50 bp with multiplier of 3, MVA is reduced from 2.66 bp to 1.74 bp. 
 
Table 2. XVA netting effects shown for a 5 and 10y curve trade. 
   
  NPV CVA DVA CFA DFA MVA TVA 
5y payer -19.74 1.2 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.47 1.47 
10y rec 14.38 1.64 3.09 0.41 1.65 2.19 -0.5 
Sum -5.36 2.84 3.4 0.7 1.83 2.66 0.97 
Portf -2.84 0.89 2.86 0.21 1.52 1.74 -1.54 
difference 2.52 -1.95 -0.54 -0.49 -0.31 -0.92 -2.51 
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Last column shows total valuation adjustment (TVA=CVA-DVA+CFA-
DFA+MVA.)  
Table 3 shows another strategy, a combination of long 7 year cap with strike at 
2.95% and short a floor at 2.36%, which creates shifted positive and negative payoff. For 
the long cap when priced standalone, there is no DVA and DFA, and for the short floor, 
no CVA and CFA. MVA however is asymmetric and exists with both positive exposure 
(long cap) and negative exposure (short floor.)  
 
Table 3. XVA netting effects for a long cap short floor combination. 
  
  NPV CVA DVA CFA DFA MVA TVA 
Cap 32.64 6.43 0 1.49 0 0.669 8.589 
Floor -38.84 0 0.76 0 0.42 0.2493 -0.9307 
Sum -6.2 6.43 0.76 1.49 0.42 0.9183 7.6583 
Portf -4.65 4.41 0.17 1.02 0.1 0.9222 6.0822 
difference 1.55 -2.02 -0.59 -0.47 -0.32 0.0039 -1.5761 
  
Table 4 compares FD with Monte Carlo simulation for a 10 year receiver swap. 
The difference between these two solutions are less than 0.03 bp for swap npv yield value 
and 0.02 to 0.07 bp for MVA. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of FD and Monte Carlo regression/simulation (MC-RS) solution. 
 
C-Libor "Rating" FD-NPV 
FD-
MVA 
MC-RS 
NPV 
MC-RS 
MVA 
37.5 AAA/AA+ 2.5861 2.307 2.566 2.333 
75 AA/AA- 2.4565 2.295 2.435 2.323 
125 A 2.2872 2.28 2.265 2.311 
250 BBB 1.881 2.243 1.856 2.28 
500 BB 1.1361 2.176 1.109 2.224 
1000 B -0.1285 2.066 -0.155 2.134 
 
 Following Green and Kenyon (2015)'s construction of a large test swap portfolio 
to compare FVA and MVA's magnitude, Table 5 shows MVA and CRA when the 
portfolio is 90%, 50%, and 10% payer, between two BCBS-IOSCO counterparties of the 
same credit spread of 125 bp. In the case of a predominantly payer swap portfolio of net 
notional of 765.7 million, the npv is -872.8 bp of the gross (not annualized). 
Unannualized CRA is -28.6 bp vs MVA of 25 bp. The sum of DVA and CFA is roughly 
about twice as much as MVA, similar to Green and Kenyon. This type of comparison, 
however, obviously depends on what IM funding spread is used, as shown in the next 
example. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of CRA and MVA (with multiplier of 3) for three portfolios of 1000 
swaps with tenors from 3 month to 30 years, gross notional of 1,002.1 million. 
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Payer% 
Net Ntl 
(mm) NPV (bp) CVA DVA CFA DFA CRA MVA 
90% 765.7 -872.8 18.8 37.1 9.6 19.9 -28.6 25 
50% -17.8 14.3 1.8 0.3 0.9 0.1 2.3 0.6 
10% -770.7 805 35.4 18.4 19.2 9.5 26.7 18.8 
 
5.3. ISDA SIMM pricing for equity risk  
 
 For equity, commodity, and fx risk factors, incorporating IM and its funding cost 
in the PDE is useful, allowing existing models to be reused with little modification. Table 
6 shows MVA for at-the-money European call options of 1 year and 2 year expiry, under 
some typical IM funding scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume 50% of the IM is 
funded at secured rate of 0.5% and the rest at the firm's senior unsecured rate of 1%.  The 
one year call's MVA is only 15 cent, out of its risk free fair value of 20.1346. The other 
four scenarios range from full leverage ('0% Lev' row), BASEL III's minimum 3% 
required leverage ratio, 6% for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and 
no leverage, i.e., full equity funding at a return on equity (ROE) target of 15%. Obviously 
as uses of leverage decrease from full leverage to no leverage, the effective IM funding 
spread increases from 1% to 15%. MVA increases accordingly from 20 cents to 2 dollars 
and 92 cents. 
Under ISDA SIMM, MVA breaks down into delta and vega/gamma contributions, 
the latter shown in column 'MVA-gv', which is approximately 25% of the total MVA 
under all funding scenarios considered. Applying an extra multiplier of 3, for instance, 
increases MVA almost by three times. MVA doubles when the expiry is extended to 2 
years. The last two columns then show the bid and ask prices.  
Column 'MVA-M 0.234' applies a multiplier of 0.234, calculated as the 
proportion of the incremental IM of adding a new stock option to an existing portfolio of 
100 stocks randomly scattered in SIMM's 12 buckets, to the standalone IM. The 
incremental MVA is much smaller than the standalone MVA shown in column 'MVA-
dgv'. 
 
Table 6. MVA of European call options, S=K=100, vol=50%, r=1%, T=1 or 2 years. 
'MVA-dgv' column shows one year option's MVA inclusive of delta, curvature gamma 
and vega risks; 'MVA-gv' gamma and vega risk only. 'MVA -M3' applies a multiplier of 
3 to all risks; and 'MVA 2y dgv' shows 2 year option's all-inclusive MVA.  
 
IM funding Sprd (%) 
MVA-
dgv MVA-gv 
MVA-
M0.234 
MVA 2y 
dgv Bid  Ask 
50% Sec-0% 
Lev 0.75 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.32 19.98 20.21 
0% Lev 1 0.20 0.05 0.09 0.42 19.77 20.32 
3% Lev 1.42 0.28 0.07 0.07 0.60 19.85 20.28 
6% Lev 1.84 0.37 0.09 0.05 0.77 19.93 20.24 
100% Lev 15 2.92 0.75 0.70 6.00 17.22 21.74 
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5.4. Incremental MVA and CME-LCH basis 
 
The IM multiplier introduced can be used to calibrate to a CCP’s IM calculation 
on a given commodity portfolio. Let ηp denote the calibrated portfolio multiplier. Now 
suppose a new trade is to be added to the existing portfolio. An incremental pricing 
scheme could be to apply ηp to the new trade as if it is a standalone trade solved by its 
standard pricing model, e.g., a finite difference model. Here we attempt to explain the 
CME-LCH basis spread with the multiplier’s variability.  
Suppose a dealer hedges a CME swap with an asset manager with another b/d in 
LCH. The dealer receives the CME-LCH basis spread to cover its cost of funding its dual 
IM posting at both CME and LCH. Obviously the basis is proportional to the allocated 
multiplier ηp. When the pace of new trade flow is slow, ηp is small, resulting in a small 
basis. But when the flow increases multiple times, the allocated ηp is much greater, 
leading to multiplication of the basis, providing support for a popular explanation of 
recent widening of CME-LCH swap basis, e.g. 30 year swap spread close to 3.7 bp on 
November 17, 2015, which is related to a jump of one-sided flow of asset managers 
swapping out fixed rates to b/d in CME and b/d’s back-to-back hedging in LCH (Khwaja, 
2015). 
Figure 1 shows a 10 year ATM swap’s MVA (in yield value, bp) on the b/d 
receiving fixed with CME and MVA due to paying fixed with LCH. The IM funding cost 
is fixed at 100 bp, assuming the b/d can fund half of the IM at a secured cost of 40 bp, 
and the remaining half split between its equity capital with 10% ROE and unsecured debt 
rate of 125 bp modulated at 25 leverage ratio. Both MVAs increase as ηp goes up, 
assuming the same ηp in both CME and LCH. Adding up these two MVAs gets the 
corresponding swap rate basis spread between CME and LCH. The left end has 
ηp=0.1088 and a basis spread of 0.22 bp, a level prior to the widening. The peak CME-
LCH 10y basis of 2.887 bp observed in November 2015 corresponds to ηp=1.4142. 
 
 
Figure 1. Inter-CCP MVA (MVA on paying fixed with one CCP and MVA on receiving 
fixed with another) varies on multiplier. 
   
  18 
  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
By adopting an idealized redundant initial margin account, the liability-side 
pricing theory is extended to cope with IM funding costs. The combination of computing 
IM by a delta-approximated VaR in the pricing measure and a multiplier calibrated to 
external IM models on real portfolios allows a balance of meeting CCP or regulatory 
requirements and having numerically efficient implementations. For uncollateralized 
customer trades, margin valuation adjustment (MVA) is defined as the liability-side 
discounted funding costs on the expected margin profile when it can be exogenously 
determined, or a component of an all-in price governed by an extended PDE and solved 
by finite difference methods. At 10-day 99-percentile, and 150 bp margin funding cost, a 
standalone at-the-money uncollateralized client swap of 10 year maturity shows about 2 
basis point equivalent charge to be fully transferred to the client.  
For CCP cleared or BCBS-IOSCO covered non-centrally cleared OTC 
derivatives, IM funding charge is effectively a bi-way tax, unless one party serves as the 
market maker whereas the funding charge is transferred in the form of a bid-ask spread, 
which can be solved from the PDE with links to external IM models such as ISDA 
SIMM. This PDE approach is particularly fitting for equity, commodity, or fx derivatives 
portfolio, with SIMM's vega and gamma contribution to initial margin captured in the 
PDE's gamma term. 
The multiplier can also be used for portfolio level incremental pricing, as used to 
illustrate recent CME-LCH basis spread widening due to jumps in MVA following 
dealers’ hedging of customer flows. 
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